INTRODUCTION
cross the Middle East and North Africa, corrupt dictatorships are currently being swept away with astonishing speed. To fulfill the democratic promise of this wave of authoritarian collapse, these nations must build political systems committed to pluralism, the rule of law, and representative government. 1 The adherence to written constitutional rules that structure and limit the exercise of political power is central to this mission. 2 But how can these countries transform written constitutional rules into a "respect-worthy" form of higher law that can actually limit the power of government? 3 125-28 (2003) . Jack Balkin describes Michelman's concept of respect-worthy as something more than merely legal validity in a positivist sense, and something less than complete justice. Rather, legitimacy is a feature of legal systems that makes them worthy of respect, so that people living in legitimate legal systems have reasons to accept the use of
2012]
POPULAR of these rules and transforming them into a form of higher law. 7 Popular constitution-making is grounded on the belief that a successful process of constitution-making must be separated from ordinary politics. This view is so deeply ingrained that a recent article found that " [n] early all the normative and positive work on constitutions proceeds from the assumption that constitutional politics are fundamentally different in character from ordinary politics." 8 In constructing a normative agenda for post-authoritarian constitution-making, scholars and commentators have drawn on this belief to encourage new democracies to deploy extraordinary popular mechanisms such as constitutional conventions and referendums in their constitutionmaking process. 9 The experience of constitution-making in post-Communist Europe and Asia, however, challenges this scholarly consensus. First, many Central and Eastern European post-Communist countries have established strong systems of constitutional review without using popular mechanisms to draft and ratify their constitutions. Instead, they used inherited, Communistera institutions and related rules to draft their new constitutions, a process that Andrew Arato calls "parliamentary constitution-making." 10 In these countries, "[c]onstitutional change was so closely associated with political change that it implied a constitutional politics not readily distinguishable from ordinary politics." 11 The relative success of this form of parliamentary 7. This is an author-based theory of "legitimacy," where a constitution is "respect-worthy" because of who drafted it. And, arguably, the most democratically "legitimate" author of a democratic constitution is the people themselves. For more, see Michelman, supra note 3, at 125-28.
8. 
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[Vol. 38:1 constitution-making in building constitutional orders that limited political power and protected individual rights has led some scholars to formulate a new "legal" model for democratic constitutional adoption. 12 Second, and more disturbingly, the mechanisms and rhetoric of popular constitution-making have not produced constitutions that limit the concentration of power and protect individual liberty in the post-Communist world. Instead, irregular popular mechanisms like referendums and constitutional conventions have helped charismatic presidents unilaterally impose authoritarian constitutions on society. 13 As Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein describe it, "the greater role granted to popular referenda and extra-parliamentary authorities, the less constitutionalism matters as a political force." 14 This Article will explore why popular constitution-making has led to constitutional dictatorship. Part I will detail the theoretical underpinnings of popular constitution-making. 15 Part II will describe how many Eastern European countries rejected popular constitution-making and instead drafted new constitutions through ordinary political processes and within the preexisting legal system. 16 Part III will demonstrate how popular constitution-making has helped undermine constitutionalism by providing opportunities for charismatic politicians with little desire for constitutionally-limited government to appeal to the people. Claiming to be the agent of the people, these charismatic figures were then able to justify their decisions to sidestep parliamentary opposition and push through "authoritarian constitutions" that concentrated vast power in their own hands. 17 Part IV will conclude by stressing the importance of stable rules and institutions in constraining the constitutionmaking process. As post-Communist countries began to draft new democratic constitutions in the late 1980s and early 1990s, political scientists and constitutional theorists focused on a largely neglected question at the intersection of constitutional and democratic theory: How can new democracies increase the likelihood that new written constitutional rules will-in contrast to their authoritarian-era predecessors-create binding constitutional law that can limit governmental power? 19 This field of inquiry was entirely new in the early 1990s. Writing in 1992, Bruce Ackerman deplored the lack of a "powerful literature" that described how "[a] piece of paper calling itself a constitution can be . . . a profound act of political self-definition." 20 To address this question, theorists began by considering strategies for boosting the "democratic legitimacy" or "respectworthiness" of a new democratic constitution. 21 Hesitant to recommend specific constitutional content, theorists focused purely on an ideal process of constitutional foundation that would ensure that the new constitution was generated by the true sovereign power in a democracy, the people. This "authorbased" version of constitutional legitimacy would ensure that the constitution would be respect-worthy by connecting "the revolutionary will of the people" to "the making of a constitution. 
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This author-based approach drew heavily on the concept of "constituent power" developed by the French theorist Emmanuel Joseph Sieyes. 23 Sieyes's theory held that the people-or as he termed it, "the Nation"-act in two capacities in a democracy. The Nation most often acts through ordinary institutions and elected representatives within pre-established rules. In exceptional situations, however, the Nation exercises its sovereign "constituent power" (pouvoir constituant) to repudiate existing legality and establish a new government of "constituted powers" (pouvoir constitue), such as a parliament, an executive, or courts. 24 A truly democratic constitution, unlike legislation, is therefore the product of an exceptional moment of popular mobilization in which the monolithic mass of the Nation directly creates a new constitutional order. 25 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 199, 215 (2010) ("[T]he basic condition for democratic legitimacy is the realization of democracy at the level of the fundamental laws-that ordinary citizens have the real possibility of participating in the re-constitution of the norms that govern the state through highly participatory procedures. In other words, the democratic legitimacy of a constitutional regime depends on the way in which it approaches the question of constituent 23. See SIEYES, supra note 6, at 136-39. The American revolutionaries also drew on the concept of popular sovereignty as the basis for new constitutional law. They were, however, more cautious in exercising that power. James Madison wrote that the people's exercise of constituent power is of "too ticklish a nature to be unnecessarily multiplied." THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 341 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). John Adams commented that "[i]t is certain, in theory, that the only moral foundation of government is, the consent of the people. But to what extent shall we carry this principle?" Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776), in 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR, NOTES, AND ILLUSTRATIONS 375 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1854).
24. SIEYES, supra note 6, at 136-39. Sieyes therefore had a unitary vision of popular sovereignty. Sieyes saw natural law as a limit on the constituent power of the Nation. See Colon-Rios, supra note 22, at 205-206.
25. SIEYES, supra note 6, at 136-37. This theory of constitutional legitimacy is grounded on social contract theory and sees constitutions as a special kind of contract between the people and their government. "Social contract theory imagines political societies as resting on a fundamental agreement, adopted at a discrete moment in hypothetical time, that both bound individual persons together into a single polity and set fundamental rules regarding that polity's structure and powers." Jacob T. Levy, Not So Novus an Ordo: Constitutions Without Social Contracts, 37 POL. THEORY 191, 192 (2009) 
2012]

POPULAR CONSTITUTION-MAKING 199
Popular constitution-making theory draws its inspiration from Sieyes's belief that popular sovereignty is synonymous with the unitary concept of the nation. 26 It stands for the principle that for the people to truly act, they must do so outside of the ordinary, pre-existing rules or institutional subdivisions inherited from the old regime. 27 Instead, they must act as a national whole. This disregard for pre-existing legality and institutions is not a problem; it instead creates the basis or "political bottom" 28 for a new democratic constitution. 29 Illegal revolu-(providing further background on social contract theory). This theory therefore draws on enlightenment thinking that sees constitution-making as the product of the people's rational will.
26. As Communism collapsed, commentators drew on popular constitution-making to formulate a normative agenda for postCommunist constitutional adoption. 30 Popular constitutionmaking lent itself well to post-Communist constitutional creation because it linked the revolutionary street protests in city squares across the former Communist countries to the creation of binding constitutional law. 31 Seen as products of the masses of newly liberated post-Communist people, new constitutional rules would be protected "against erosion by political elites who had failed to gain broad and deep popular support for their innovations." 32 To build binding new constitutional law, commentators therefore stridently opposed parliamentary constitution-making or adherence to pre-existing constitutional rules. These commentators instead argued that new democracies should turn to irregular institutions such as constituent assemblies and popular referendums, which could capture the collective voice of the Nation. 33 31. See supra note 9. Other potential theories of constitutional legitimacy were not as appealing. For instance, foundationalism-the concept that postCommunist constitutional legitimacy would be drawn from constitutions with certain democratic provisions-was rejected for being too elitist. Furthermore, the Burkean historicism belief in gradual constitutional change placed too much emphasis on these countries' illiberal history. Finally, monism-the idea that elected legislatures should generate constitutional law-was seen as too easily overturned by temporary majorities. For more, see ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 3-33 (analyzing competing theories of constitutional legitimacy).
32. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 10. Bruce Ackerman, "America's greatest theorist of transition," has described this popular constitution-making agenda in detail. 35 Ackerman strongly urged post-Communist drafters to avoid "a series of ad hoc modifications of the older Communist texts" through parliamentary amendment. 36 Instead, he argued, constitutional drafters should aspire "to attempt a comprehensive statement of their revolutionary principles." 37 Calling this the "triumphalist scenario," Ackerman argued that appealing to the people would lead to the constitutionalization of post-Communist revolutionary fervor. 38 To draft a new constitution, Ackerman suggested that postCommunist constitutional drafters should convene a constitutional convention to capture the people's true constituent power. 39 Although newly elected post-Communist legislatures were unlikely to legally authorize these irregular institutions, Ackerman was not worried. 40 Instead, he argued that the extralegal nature of these bodies accorded them important symbolic value, as had been in the case in the United States:
To them, the legally anomalous character of the "convention" was not a sign of defective legal status but of revolutionary possibility-that a group of patriots might speak for the People with greater political legitimacy than any assembly whose that elicited popular consent-ideally, in a referendum." Donald S. 
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[Vol. 38:1 authority arose only from its legal form. . . . As the revolutionary years moved on, Americans insisted that the People could deliberate on constitutional matters only in special bodies whose very name-"convention"-denied that legal forms could ultimately substitute for the engaged participation of citizens. 41 Ackerman also argued that popular referendums should be an important part of the constitution-making process. He believed that referendums echoed the spirit of the American Revolution where the drafters "appealed for support from the People over the heads of existing governments." 42 In particular, a referendum would be critical in ensuring that the constitution would serve as "a popular symbol of the revolutionary generation's achievement" 43 and would capture a "mandate from the people." 44 To mobilize popular opinion around these irregular institutions, Ackerman called for strong charismatic presidential leadership. 45 In particular, Ackerman pushed for the constitutionalization of presidential charisma to avoid a constitution with "soft constitutional norms" that would be "too easy for a parliamentary majority" to ignore. 46 Consequently, he encouraged Russian President Boris Yeltsin to refuse to "strike a deal" with the members of the elected Russian Parliament and instead encouraged him to "use the impasse [with parliament]" to catalyze popular opinion behind a new democratic constitution. 47 Jon Elster, the leading political scientist to address this field of constitution-making, drew on the insights of political science in support of popular constitution-making. Using eighteenthcentury French and American history as examples, he rea- 
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soned, "constitutions ought to be written by specially convened assemblies and not by bodies that also serve as ordinary legislatures. Nor should the legislatures be given a central place in the process of ratification." 48 Elster argued that an irregular constitutional convention, in contrast to an ordinary legislature, was far more likely to be an impartial body of deep deliberation necessary for constitutionmaking. For Elster, the irregular nature of these institutions would help insulate the process of constitution-making from the taint of short-term political bargaining. 49 He reasoned that conventions "promote the predominance of reason over interest" 50 because "the pressure on speakers to produce impartial arguments may be especially strong in the constitutional setting, compared to ordinary legislatures." 51 This production of a more principled decision would help ensure a more apolitical and legitimate constitution. Without taking such an irregular path, "a constitution will lack legitimacy to the extent that it is perceived to be a mere bargain among interest groups rather than the outcome of rational argument about the common good." 52
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION BY MIXING ORDINARY AND EXTRAORDINARY POLITICS
This new trend towards peaceful transition is puzzling because it raises serious questions about the accepted wisdom that genuine transitions to constitutional democracy require a violent tear in the political fabric and a radical shift in the polity's conception of its own identity. 53 A large number of Central and East European countries have been successful in constructing constitutional democracy with- 
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[Vol. 38:1 out employing the mechanisms and rhetoric of popular constitution-making. 54 These countries consciously rejected revolutionary mechanisms in favor of negotiated paths to constitutional foundation. For instance, a "high-ranking Hungarian jurist . . . remarked that even enthusiastic supporters," of political change in Hungary "avoid[ed] the term 'revolution,' preferring to speak of 'peaceful transition' instead." 55 As Andrew Arato observed, Central and Eastern European constitutional drafters sought to avoid a "state of nature, outside of all law by postulating constitutional continuity with old regimes." 56 As a result, Central and East European countries actively avoided revolutionary attempts at popular constitutionmaking. In Hungary, a pro-presidential group "presented a petition with 200,000 signatures calling on parliament to hold a referendum which would decide," whether to introduce direct presidential elections and also whether to shift "some powers from the government to the president." 57 The Hungarian Parliament rejected this option after the Constitutional Court ruled that the "constitution cannot be amended by referenda." 58 Similarly, when Albanian President Sali Berisha's constitutional draft, which faced criticism for its authoritarian tendencies, failed to gain the necessary support in the parliament, President Berisha attempted to circumvent the Albanian Parliament and put his draft to a referendum. 59 The Constitutional Court in Albania ruled "that submitting the constitution to a popular vote without first asking parliament to vote violated the Law on Major Constitutional Provisions." 60 Finally, in Poland, a center-right party "drummed up half-a-million signatures and demanded a parallel referendum on their version of 54. The success of constitutional democracy in these countries does not necessarily spring from the process of constitution-making; there are of course additional factors at play outside of the scope of this Article. 
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POPULAR CONSTITUTION-MAKING 205 the civic constitution." 61 The Polish parliament successfully blocked this attempt to appeal to the people through irregular processes. 62 Instead, the Central and East European countries amended and established new constitutional orders by combining ordinary and extraordinary institutional mechanisms. 63 Ordinary parliaments became the locus for both ordinary legislation and constitutional lawmaking, linking an emerging culture of civil engagement through parliamentary-based politics to the creation of constitutions. 64 These newly empowered parliaments created commissions, consisting of both legal experts and members of parliament, to draft the post-Communist constitutions under the standing rules set forth in their parliamentary tradition. These drafts were only given to the people in a referendum after parliamentary ratification in accordance with procedures inherited from amended Communist-era constitutions. 65 A. E. Dick Howard also criticized Central and Eastern European drafters for failing to draw on the people's constituent power in the creation of a new constitution. He found it to be a "paradox" that "[t]he device of the constitutional convention or constituent assembly is not used" while "referenda are quite rare." 79 81 The relative success of these countries' transitions to their new constitutions might suggest that a constitutional order does not draw its "respect-worthiness" solely from the process of constitutionmaking. 82 Scholars have begun to acknowledge that mixing ordinary and extraordinary mechanisms in constitution-making presents an alternate route to constitutionalism. 83 Cass Sunstein and Stephen Holmes argued that although "a sharp split" between constitution-making and ordinary politics is "preferable", the "peculiar conditions of Eastern Europe do not make this a sensible solution." 84 
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The legally anomalous and extra-parliamentary mechanisms and rhetoric of popular constitution-making, however, did play an important role in post-Communist constitution-making further east. In the former Soviet Union, these irregular and popular mechanisms emerged as a useful tool for power-hungry politicians bent on reasserting personal leadership but unable to risk the domestic and international costs of openly autocratic rule amidst a post-Cold War global democratic "zeitgeist." Consequently, these post-Communist figures manipulated referendums and produced highly choreographed constitutional conventions to delegitimize ordinary constitutional rules and institutions such as parliaments, and to constitutionalize presidential dictatorship. 92 In other words, the mechanisms of constituent power helped cloak the creation of plebiscitary dictatorship in the garb of liberal constitutionalism. Russia's process of post-Soviet constitutional foundation is the paradigmatic example.
A. Russia
Russia initially followed the "parliamentary" model of constitution-making. By 1992, the Russian parliament had amended the Communist-era constitution numerous times and created a constitutional document that bore little resemblance to its Soviet-era counterpart. 93 Most importantly, the constitution no longer contained any reference to the Communist Party's monopoly on power and instead established a constitutional system of parliamentary supremacy with an elected president and a constitutional court. 94 The two-tiered Russian parliament emerged at the center of this new constitutional system. At the base of this two-tiered system was the Congress of People's Deputies ("Congress"), a body that was elected in March 1990 and comprised of 1,098 
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members. 95 The Congress had the power to amend the constitution, pass laws, elect a chairman, and approve the head of government as well as other state officials. 96 The Congress, therefore, was "like a constituent assembly, which assumes control of the state temporarily in a time of crisis in order to lay the constitutional foundations of a new political order." 97 To govern between its meetings, the Congress elected a permanent standing body, the Supreme Soviet. 98 Both the Supreme Soviet and the Congress became important arenas for political debate and criticism. In fact, as Yeltsin's rapid economic reforms grew increasingly unpopular, these representative bodies became a key point of opposition. 99 The Supreme Soviet also emerged as a focal point for constitutionmaking, creating a Constitutional Commission under the leadership of Oleg Rumiantsev. Rumiantsev was a leading Russian westernizer; he had convened a discussion group, Democratic Perestroika, which was one of Moscow's many such small, informal political discussion groups. 100 Mr. Rumiantsev's draft constitution ultimately sought to draw on this advice to create a western-style semi-presidential system in Russia. 101 
THOMAS F. REMINGTON, RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT: INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION IN
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The Russian Constitutional Court
The newly created Russian Constitutional Court emerged as a surprisingly powerful body in enforcing the amended Communist-era Russian Constitution. Under the energetic leadership of Chairman Valerii Zorkin, the Court attempted to ensure that the new amendments, which proclaimed separation of powers and law-based limitations on government, were adequately enforced. 102 In its first case, the Court struck down a presidential decree seeking to merge the Internal Police and the Foreign Intelligence Service. The Court opened this decision with a broad statement that "[o]ne of the fundamental principles of a constitutional system is that each government institution may only make decisions and carry out actions that are within its competency, determined in the Constitution." 103 The Court went on to state that "[t]he President is not able to contradict the Constitution and the laws of the Russian Federation or the elements of a system of checks and balances, underpinned by the principle of separation of powers based in Article 3 of the Russian Declaration of Sovereignty." 104 The Zorkin Court did not just limit presidential power, later decisions also struck down unconstitutional extensions of power by the Russian Parliament. 105 Zorkin's attempts to enforce Russia's amended constitutional system were complicated because much of the Russian political elite were unaccustomed to constitutional limitations on the practice of political power. As Zorkin explained in a speech to the Congress in the spring of 1992, many officials in both the presidential and parliamentary branches of power were unwill- 
Kim Lane Scheppelle, Guardians of the Constitution: Constitutional Court Presidents and the Struggle for the Rule of Law in Post-
Yeltsin's Visions of Presidentially-Dominated Form of Government
The first elected president, Boris Yeltsin, and his supporters were hostile to constitutional limits on presidential power. They saw a truly democratic constitutional order as one with an elected president as the supreme institution. 107 In a speech to the parliament, Yeltsin described the underlying centrality of presidential dominance in Russian democracy, asserting, "I am a strong proponent of presidential power. But not because I am president, but because without the presidency Russia would not survive . . . because the president is elected by the entire people, he embodies the integrity and unity of Russia." 108 One of Yeltsin's aides outlined the presidential administration's vision of presidential power. He explained that the Russian president differs from the presidency: imagined in textbooks or in its classical form. The fundamental concept of the presidency is as the superior power. The presidency ensures the idea of an independent and responsible Government, formed in order to decide questions of governmental operation. And the presidency ensures that the Government works with the regional legislatures in the creation of a single governmental vertical. 109 
106.
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This aide insisted that this system was democratic because of its basis in popular sovereignty, or narodovlastie. 110 In other words, the Russian Presidency's power flowed directly from its embodiment of the people's constituent power.
Yeltsin's De-Legitimization of Existing Political Institutions
This view of superior presidential power conflicted with Russia's amended Communist-era constitution. Thus, it was only a matter of time before the president would come into conflict with constitutional legality and its two chief institutions, the Constitutional Court and the parliament. In this struggle, Yeltsin repeatedly attempted to argue that both the Constitutional Court and the parliament were Communist-era relics that did not represent the people's newfound constituent power. 111 This feud began in earnest at the end of 1992 when President Yeltsin demanded that Congress renew his expansive decree powers so that he could continue his macroeconomic reforms. 112 Without these powers, the Presidency could no longer fulfill the presidential administration's expansive view of "proper" presidential power. As Congress debated whether to renew the delegation of these powers to Yeltsin, rumors circulated of a presidential coup d'état. 113 In a December 10, 1992 speech to the Congress, President Yeltsin attacked the existing constitution for affording too much power to the legislature, protesting, "[t]he constitution, or what has become of it, is turning the Supreme Soviet, its leadership and its Chairman into the absolute rulers of Russia . . . [they are] accustomed to giving orders without being accountable." 114 Drawing on the language of 110. Id. This aide proclaimed that the "stable, strong, and capable organization of power" is rooted in a "democratic basis: popular sovereignty (narodovlastie). . . . The people decide the matter." Id. As Yeltsin stepped up these attacks and it seemed that Russia was on the brink of civil war, Chairman Zorkin stepped in to broker a compromise. He was ultimately successful. President Yeltsin and the leader of parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, reached a compromise-Khasbulatov agreed to a referendum in April 1993 in return for Yeltsin's agreement to choose a Prime Minister from the three candidates having the broadest support in the Congress. 116 In January 1993, the leader of the Russian parliament, realizing the dangerous ramifications of allowing Yeltsin a popular mandate in a popular referendum, attempted to back away from this promise. He argued that a referendum was simply an appeal to mob rule and a way to "distract public opinion from the truth, to separate people into the 'just' (supporters of the strengthening of presidential power) and the 'unjust' ('the antireformers' and 'all those reactionary Deputies'), and to establish some type of dictatorial regime (a regime of mob rule)." 117 As the constitutional debate raged on, the Congress met again in March 1993. 118 The leader of parliament warned that Yeltsin's appeals to the people's constituent power "devalue the existing Constitution, destabilize the political situation . . .
The President of Russia Sees Holding a Nationwide Referendum as the
[and] have a certain logic, which consists, apparently, in implying that the potential for carrying out ultraradical reforms by
[Vol. 38:1 constitutional, democratic methods have been exhausted." 119 The Congress responded by stripping Yeltsin of his extraordinary powers, 120 reducing the Russian Presidency to its textual role as head of the executive branch in a formal semipresidential, separation-of-powers system. 121 Yeltsin refused to accept this arrangement. In a March 20th televised speech, he called for "special administrative rule, a condition in which the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies would be subordinated to the president and would not have the right to cancel his decrees or to pass laws contradicting them." 122 In support of this coup, he argued that the Congress was undermining the people's ability to realize their constituent power:
The eighth Congress was, in point of fact, a dress rehearsal for revenge by members of former Party nomenklatura. They simply want to deceive the people. We hear them lie in the oaths of loyalty to the Constitution that they continually take; from Congress to Congress, that document is bent and reshaped in their own interests, and blow after blow is dealt to the very foundation of the constitutional system of popular sovereignty [(narodovlastie)]. 123 This move, however, met stiff resistance; the existing constitutional rules still commanded respect. Most importantly, the head of the Russian Armed Forces spoke out against Yeltsin's speech in a hastily convened session of the Presiding Committee of the Supreme Soviet, saying that the Armed Forces would not participate in political infighting and would follow the constitution. 124 The Constitutional Court convened a special ses- 124. MEDVEDEV, supra note 122, at 97. According to Medvedev, Yeltsin had taped the speech on the morning of March 20th and had distributed tapes to the foreign embassies before consulting his advisors. The secretary of Yeltsin's Security Council, Yuri Skokov, refused to endorse the new decree and tried to persuade Yeltsin not to take this step. Id. sion on March 21st and, by the morning of March 22nd, had declared Yeltsin's speech unconstitutional. 125 The Congress also met on March 21st and called an emergency session for March 26th. 126 Yeltsin backed down when he saw that his attempt at a rupture in legality was not going to be successful; the published decree from his speech on March 24th deleted any mention of "special administrative rule." 127 The Congress convened a special session on March 28th to consider Yeltsin's impeachment and the referendum. 128 In Red Square, Yeltsin gave a speech to a crowd of supporters claiming that the impeachment vote did not matter because he would only submit to the "verdict of the people." 129 66 percent of the deputies called for his impeachment, uncomfortably close to the 75 percent needed. The deputies also voted to hold a referendum on April 25, 1993. 130 Yeltsin's political luck had held; he now would have his chance to appeal to the limitless constituent power of the people. After a dispute between parliamentary members and the president, the Constitutional Court ruled that the first two questions did not have "legal significance" and therefore would not 
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[Vol. 38:1 make any legal changes to the constitution. 132 Yeltsin's team, however, ignored this decision. For them, a mandate from the people transcended any pre-existing rules or institutions. As one of Yeltsin's closest constitutional advisors, Sergei Shakhrai, stated "[i]f the president receives a vote of confidence on the first referendum question while on the fourth question the electorate votes for early elections for the People's Deputies, he will fully implement the provisions in his March 20 televised address to the people." 133 After a fierce political campaign, 58.05% of voters in the referendum expressed their confidence in Boris Yeltsin's leadership. 134 Despite the Constitutional Court's decision, Yeltsin's team immediately capitalized on these results. Yeltsin proclaimed that "[t]he Russian Soviet Federation Socialist Republic has been peacefully replaced by the Russian Federation. The state has changed its legal identity," 135 A key Yeltsin advisor held a press conference and proclaimed that the Congress could no longer remove the president from his post, force the government to resign, or adopt a new constitution. 136 Asked what would happen if the Congress failed to comply, he said "[t]he president and the government received a vote of confidence in the referendum. They will conduct the economic reform on the basis of their own decisions." 137 The message from the Yeltsin Administration was clear-no pre-existing institution or rule could limit the supreme force of the Russian people's constituent power. 
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To realize his popular mandate and formalize its transformative effects, Yeltsin convened an appointed constitutional convention. Yeltsin saw this extralegal body, which unlike the Congress was unelected, as a kind of proto-legislature that would replace the sitting parliament. 138 He commented that "[i]t seem[ed] to [him] that the constitutional convention can be transferred into a Federation Council and will be one of the houses of parliament." 139 Parliamentary delegates were not welcome. For instance, after trying to take the podium in the early days of the Convention, Khasbulatov was shouted down by the audience, after which he led seventy representatives from local parliaments in walking out and in calling the conference a sham. 140 The sessions of the Constitutional Convention were closed, and only the working commission could approve changes to the constitution. The working commission was a smaller body comprised of Yeltsin's closest advisors and regional executives who saw Yeltsin's desire to eliminate legislative power as a way of increasing their own power in the regions. 141 
Legitimizing Extra-legality
The Constitutional Convention eventually produced a constitution that formalized the Yeltsin Administration's authoritarian vision for Russia's constitutional system. In order to avoid any parliamentary checks, the Constitutional Convention placed the president above the system of separated power. 142 As the embodiment of the people and the head of the unitary state, the president was the "guarantor" of the constitution and en- 
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[Vol. 38:1 sured the harmonious interaction of the branches. 143 The text contained very few limitations on presidential power. Unsurprisingly, neither parliament nor the regional parliaments were eager to ratify this new constitution. Refusing to compromise with the parliament, which had written its own draft constitution based on Western constitutionalism, Yeltsin issued a decree on September 21, 1993 disbanding the Russian Parliament and all regional parliaments, and prohibiting the Constitutional Court from meeting. 144 The decree suspended any parts of the existing constitution that contradicted the decree. The decree claimed legitimacy from the parliament's "direct opposition to the will of the people, reflected in the referendum of April 25, 1993. . . [which] had the highest possible legal force across the entire Russian nation." 145 Yeltsin was making the classic constituent power argument: Both the parliament and constitution under which it drew its powers were illegitimate because they had opposed the people's sovereign constituent power.
As they had done in March, both parliament and the Constitutional Court reacted immediately. The Constitutional Court declared Yeltsin's decree unconstitutional and authorized the legislature to impeach Yeltsin under the existing constitution for attempting to illegally disperse a lawfully enacted representative body. 146 The parliament swore Aleksandr Rutskoi in as the new president and he began issuing decrees. 147 
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POPULAR CONSTITUTION-MAKING 221 own memoir, remembered how close he was to losing control of the country at this point. 148 As power hung in the balance, Yeltsin's team worked furiously to establish the legitimacy of his dissolution of parliament and proroguing of the Constitutional Court both domestically and internationally. The central argument in this effort was that President Yeltsin had acted in accordance with the constituent power and therefore his actions had been legitimate, if not technically legal. 149 For instance, the Ministry of Justice issued a statement after the dissolution of parliament seeking to justify Yeltsin's actions: "[Although the president] acted beyond the legal framework, he acted in accordance with the constitutional principles of government by the people, and to protect the will of the people." 150 Yeltsin also sought to shore up his international backers. In a speech to an audience in the United States, one of Yeltsin's advisors attacked the Russian Parliament for defying the people. He claimed:
[T]he Congress of People's Deputies [parliament] simply was unable to comprehend any rule of law higher than constitutional law, and that the Congress is unable to distinguish constitutional law from constitutional principles. The principles expressed in the current Constitution have never achieved the level of being 'constitutional.' Instead, the Constitution of the Russian Federation itself might be unconstitutional. This idea is based upon the simple notion that the current Constitution expresses principles that are in direct conflict with the will of the Russian people. 151 In contrast to Yeltsin's failed coup attempt in March, Yeltsin's September decree was far more successful in marshaling support amongst key Yeltsin constituencies in three ways. First, Yeltsin's "victory" in the April referendum helped him obtain key support from the most powerful player in the international community: the United States. During the tense standoff between Yeltsin and the parliament, United States
[ Mr. Yeltsin can claim a degree of rough-and-ready democratic legitimacy for his decrees. His 1991 election as President represented a fuller democratic choice than the 1990 parliamentary elections, in which many Kremlin-endorsed candidates ran unopposed. Just this past April, a national plebiscite conferred a fresh vote of confidence on the President and, most importantly, endorsed the early dissolution of Parliament. Given the lack of constitutional clarity, that vote gives Mr. Yeltsin moral authority to act as he did. 155 Another influential New York Times columnist, Serge Schmemann, relied on the concept of popular constitution-making to describe, how "a constitution itself could be 'unconstitutional' if it served only a small clique, that 'the people' was not only a rhetorical flourish, that a popularly elected president might have higher moral authority than a legal but dysfunctional assembly." 156 Third 
POPULAR CONSTITUTION-MAKING 223 been justified in using military force to "control the situation." 157 Most importantly, as the regional assemblies remained largely on the sidelines, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev reluctantly complied with Yeltsin's order to suppress street level disturbances and forcibly disband the parliament. 158 Only a few thousand Russians took to the streets in support of the existing constitutional legality; Yeltsin's attempts to delegitimize the previous system had proven successful.
6. An Authoritarian Constitution
As Yeltsin assumed his position as dictator in the absence of an elected parliament or constitutional court, he quickly worked to solidify his new position by ratifying a new constitution. Consequently, he signed a decree stating that he would place a draft constitution before the Russian people in a nationwide referendum set for December 12, 1993. 159 He once again sought to justify this decision by appealing to the constituent power of the people:
[r]ecognizing the unshakable nature of people's rule as the foundation of the Russian Federation's constitutional system, cognizant of the fact that the repository and sole source of power in the Russian Federation is its multinational people, and with a view to implementing the people's right to directly resolve the most important questions of the life of the state . . . . 160 Yeltsin published the official Draft Constitution on November 9, 1993. 161 Although many western commentators focused on [Vol. 38:1 its long list of individual rights, the key provisions ensured that there were no constitutional limits on presidential power. 162 The presidency remained outside the tripartite system of separated powers, exercising a fourth type of "presidential power," and enjoyed significant control over each of the three subordinate branches of government. 163 First, the President had a virtual monopoly over executive power. Article 111 (4) of the Constitution provided that if the lower house of the parliament (the Duma) rejected the president's choice of Prime Minister to lead the government, the president was then required to appoint a Prime Minister and dissolve the Duma. 164 Furthermore, the president had the power to annul any executive branch edicts. 165 Second, the president held significant constitutional power to control the legislative branch of the government. This was particularly true with regard to the upper house of the Russian Parliament, the Federation Council. 166 Article 95 (2) stated that the Federation Council was comprised of "two representatives from each of Russia's subjects: one from the executive branch and one from the legislative branch." 167 Furthermore, according to Article 77 (2), the bodies of executive power in the federal center and in the regions formed a "unified system of executive power." 168 Because of the president's monopoly over the executive branch, one-half of the "senators" in the Federation Council were therefore subordinated to the president. This subordination was deliberate because Yeltsin had originally seen the Federation Council as only a consultative body that would help the Russian president exert power in the regions. 169 ensure that the Federation Council would remain in this simply advisory role, Yeltsin personally intervened in the final days before releasing the draft and "insisted that the Federation Council be "formed" rather than "elected" as originally envisioned by the Constitutional Convention. 170 In making this change, Yeltsin hoped to ensure that this powerful body, which had the power to veto bills passed by the lower house and to confirm all judicial appointments, would stay out of party politics and remain subordinated to the presidential apparatus. 171 As the Chairman of the Federation Council said in 1999, "the upper house of the Federal Assembly is an element of stability; in a period of abrupt change it protects the country from social upheaval. For the first time in the history of Russia, a nonpolitical organ has emerged which influences state policy and stands by the people." 172 Third, the president had full control over the judicial branch of government. The president appointed all of the judges to both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court with the consent of the Federation Council. 173 Because the Federation Council was under presidential control, the president's appointment power was essentially unchecked.
On December 12, 1993, this authoritarian constitution received a slight majority in a national referendum. In the aftermath of constitutionalizing his vision of a presidential republic, Yeltsin used the language of popular constitution-making to describe the ratification, declaring, "[a] popular mandate to strengthen the system of government has been received." "No matter whom the voters cast their ballots for, they were agreed on one point: Russia needs strong rule, Russia needs order, people are irritated by the amorphous nature of power, they are tired of inconsistent and halfhearted decisions, and they the widespread opposition amongst the heads of the legislative branches, he temporarily decided that elections would yield a more pliant group of legislative representatives in the Federation Council. 
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[Vol. 38:1 are exasperated by the rise in crime." 174 Yeltsin's aides were not shy about the nature of the constitutional system that they had created. One aide admitted that the illusion of a smooth and swift transfer from a dictatorship to a free-market democracy is gone. . . . Now the talk is of a transitional regime of 'enlightened authoritarianism' or 'guided democracy' or some such hybrid that makes no secret of the need for a prolonged concentration of power in the presidency." 175
B. Belarus and Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan and Belarus initially ratified their postCommunist constitutions through parliamentary constitutionmaking. As the success of Yeltsin's extralegal actions resonated across the post-Soviet space, however, presidents in these countries, who shared Yeltsin's disdain for limitations on presidential power, exploited the rhetoric and mechanisms of popular constitution-making to assert, and legitimize, their own presidentially dominated, authoritarian constitutions.
Belarus
The Belarusian Parliament drafted Belarus's first post-Soviet constitution. The process began in November 1991, when the parliament's Constitutional Commission submitted a draft constitution to the Belarus Parliament. 176 The most debated aspect of the constitution surrounded the creation of an elected president. On one side, the Speaker of the Belarus Parliament, himself a frontrunner for the presidency, warned against introducing a president for "at least another three years" in order to ensure that "the parliament should shape up and help strengthen existing democratic institutions." 177 After numerous drafts, on March 15, 1994, the parliament finally ratified a compromise creating a strong president by a margin of four votes. 179 The newly established office of the president was given significant constitutional powers, becoming the head of state and the head of the executive. 180 This new constitution also created an independent parliament, which was the "highest representative, standing, and sole legislative body of state power" and had the power to elect the judges to the Constitutional Court. 181 Most importantly, the president could not dissolve the parliament. 182 Soon after ratification of the new constitution, Belarus elected Aleksandr Lukashenko as its first President. Lukashenko was no democrat, however, and shared Yeltsin's view that political power should be concentrated in the Presidency. As parliament became a major source of opposition to Lukashenko's policies, he increasingly moved to limit parliamentary power. In a 1995 interview on state media, President Lukashenko argued that Belarus had a similar history to Germany and therefore needed a strong leader to bring it out of its profound political and economic crisis. He stated that "German history teaches that the leading role of the president at [that] stage in history was critical and indisputable . . . ." 183 Echoing President Yeltsin's conception of the presidency, Lukashenko stated later in a speech that his ideal constitution had "'three branches of power; legislative, executive, and judicial. And all these branches grow on the tree of the presidency.'" 184 A year after his election, Lukashenko began to draw on the rhetoric and mechanisms of popular constitution-making to advance his authoritarian vision of a presidentially dominated constitutional system. "In the spring of 1995, [he] demanded the right to dissolve parliament," and illegally added that issue to a national referendum on the national symbols of Belarus. 185 He also began issuing decrees that encroached on parliamentary powers, justifying these actions on the idea that the president cannot issue an illegal decree because of his status as the constitution by a supermajority, and was the highest representative body in the nation. 218 As time went on, the Kazakh Parliament began to exercise its limited powers. In particular, it began "to develop some of the fundamental characteristics of an institution capable of providing the checks and balances essential to the functioning of a pluralistic society." 219 Underlying this parliamentary opposition was unhappiness with Nazarbaev's macroeconomic policy, which had led to a "flailing economy that sported a 2,500 percent annual inflation rate." 220 In May 1994, the parliament took the unprecedented step of giving Nazarbaev's Prime Minister a vote of "no confidence." 221 In July, parliament was able to override Nazarbaev's veto of two consumer-friendly bills. 222 The Speaker of the parliament also began to see an important role for the parliament in Kazakhstan's system of political government. He "began holding the government accountable for its actions and decrees, claiming that they must have a basis in law and that parliament had to propose and pass new legislation rather than leave the initiation of legislation to the executive branch." 223 He also called on parliamentary members to defend a parliamentary tradition in Kazakhstan that "stretch[ed] back to the councils of biis of the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries." 224 Additionally, the parliament created a new party to ensure respect for the existing constitution called the "Legal Development of Kazakhstan." 225 As in Russia and Belarus, the beginnings of a civil society were coalescing around the "ordinary" Kazakh parliament.
Nazarbaev had little patience for this growing parliamentary opposition. Instead of dispersing the parliament by force, however, Nazarbaev chose to cloak his actions in the language of popular constitution-making. His first strategy was to use his 218. The constitution required a three-fourths majority for amendments "concerning the basis of the Constitutional system." KONSTITUTSUIA RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN (1993) 
